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This paper proposes an integrated approach to minimum bank capital and loan loss 
reserves regulation. The paper breaks new ground in two main areas. In the first place it 
provides an explicit measurement of the credit loss distribution for a sample of emerging 
countries providing a benchmark for discussing the appropriate calibration of new 
regulatory capital and loan loss provision requirements for non-G10 countries. Second, on 
normative grounds, it proposes a simplified version of the “internal rating based” (IRB) 
approach as a transition tool that, while retaining a risk-based definition of solvency ratios, 
implies reduced supervisory monitoring costs and could therefore be of interest to 
emerging countries where supervisory resources are particularly scarce. 
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The debate regarding the appropriate regulation of bank capital and provisions has 
come to the fore given the recent discussions regarding the proposed revisions to the 
Basel Capital Accord, known as Basel II.  This proposal, developed by the 13 member 
countries of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) is to be finalized this 
year for implementation in member countries by 2006.  An underlying discussion hinges 
on whether regulatory capital should be related to risk.
1  We take this as a given and 
focus on the subsequent issue; if required capital is to be risk-related, how should this be 
achieved? 
Basel II proposes two basic approaches; (i) the use of external credit ratings 
agencies and a table that maps those ratings into capital requirements (this is known as 
the standardized approach) and (ii) the use of banks’ internal ratings, that banks then map 
into default probabilities, and a particular formula laid down by the BCBS that 
determines capital requirements as a function of the default probability and other 
parameters (this is known as the internal rating based or IRB approach).
2 
This paper focuses on two main issues.  First we investigate whether the IRB 
approach’s formula is appropriately calibrated for the context of emerging economies. To 
do this we must first estimate credit risk.  In a set of companion country papers
3 this is 
                                                 
1 See the many papers on the BIS website on the Accord www.bis.org.  
2 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (2003). 
3 See Balzarotti et al. (2003) for credit risk measurement in Argentina, Cronenberger et al. (2003) in Brazil, 
and Marquez et al. (2003) in Mexico. See also Foglia (2003) for a rich series of applications of credit risk 
measurement to regulation and supervision in G10 countries. All papers can be accessed on the World 
Bank website: www.econ.worldbank.org/programs/credit_reporting/topic/22476/   2
done by the use of a credit-scoring model, to estimate default probabilities, and then the 
use of a credit risk portfolio model
4 to combine individual instrument default 
probabilities into the probability distribution of losses for a portfolio.  In this paper we 
take a second and arguably a simpler approach and employ a direct sampling or 
bootstrapping methodology as proposed in Carey (2002).  The great advantage of this 
technique is that it makes it reasonably easy to produce comparable statistics across 
banks and across countries.  We believe that this is the first paper to present estimates of 
credit risk across a set of emerging economies using a homogenous methodology. More 
importantly, we show the difference between the level of expected and unexpected losses 
for G10 countries and a sample of emerging economies and illustrate how important the 
proper calibration of bank capital and loan loss reserves is to achieve the desired level of 
risk coverage. 
 Second, we propose a Basel II implementation strategy for emerging economies 
where such calibration skills could play a vital role. Currently, many of the more 
sophisticated emerging countries may fall between two stools.  On the one hand, the 
penetration of external ratings agencies is typically low and hence the standardized 
approach would yield little in linking regulatory capital to risk.
5 This argument may also 
be made considering the portfolio of some smaller or regional banks in G10 countries.  
However, in the case of emerging countries the majority of the portfolios of large and 
systemic banks are un-rated.  On the other hand, the set of procedures embedded in the 
IRB approach may be difficult to implement in emerging economies. For example, the 
                                                 
4 In the case of the paper on Argentina, Creditrisk+, a model developed by Credit Suisse Financial Products 
of CSFB. 
5 See Ferri, Liu and Majnoni (2001) for discussion on the global pattern of ratings.   3
IRB approach gives a high degree of autonomy to banks, to employ their own rating 
methodologies and their own mappings of their ratings to default probabilities, and 
requires bank supervisors to control the process, without considering that the 
sophistication and the resources of both banks and especially bank supervisors does not 
match that of their G10 counterparts. Considering the data on compliance with the Basel 
Core Principals of Effective Banking Supervision across developing countries, it may be 
a significant period of time before many countries would be advised to implement IRB.
6 
In lieu of this situation, we suggest a simplification of the IRB approach that 
builds on the current policies regarding provisioning in some emerging countries and that 
may be used as a transition arrangement toward IRB.  We name this the centralized rating 
based (CRB) approach.  Within this approach banks would rate their clients.  However, 
the rating scale and the way in which the banks’ ratings mapped into default probabilities 
would be determined by the regulator.
7  The use of a centralized scale would facilitate 
comparison across banks and would greatly ease monitoring of banks’ ratings
8.  
Moreover, as the regulator would determine how banks’ ratings would feed into capital 
requirements, those requirements would also be easier to monitor. 
                                                 
6 As reviewed in Powell (2004), the average developing country is only compliant with 7 of 30 Basel Core 
Principles. 
7 To a large extent the IRB proposals build on what large sophisticated international banks have been doing 
for some years.  In the case of these institutions it would be very restrictive to impose a standard rating 
scale.  In many emerging countries, banks have only very recently begun to develop such internal risk 
management functions and they are much less developed.  Hence while the system is clearly more 
restrictive than the IRB approach, the starting point is very different. 
8 For banks lending to the same corporate client, bank ratings could be compared directly. Bank ratings for 
similar types of loans (to companies in the same economic sector, business line or region) could also be 
compared and outliers investigated.  Informally some G10 regulators acknowledge that even where IRB 
likely to be employed, supervisors will compare banks’ internal ratings of important corporate clients (as 
they do today) and for that purpose will no doubt map ratings into a centralized scale.   4
We propose this transition measure as an initial means to enhance forward-
looking provisioning rules and monitoring. Thus, if capital is set by Basel II’s 
standardized approach, and the CRB’s default probabilities are used to appropriately 
determine the value at risk (equal to expected plus unexpected loss), then the CRB-
determined forward-looking provisioning requirement would simply be the value at risk 
minus the standardized approach’s capital requirement.  As banks’ and supervisors’ 
knowledge and skills improve over time, banks may then be authorized to use their own 
ratings scales and default probability mappings and capital to be determined by the IRB 
approach itself.  Naturally whether this approach or the IRB approach is appropriate will 
rest in part on whether the formula linking default probabilities to capital requirements is 
appropriate for the context at hand – the first issue. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the criteria followed in the 
construction of our measure of the probability distribution of credit losses and derives 
from it a quantification of the value of bank capital and loan loss reserves. Section 3 will 
present the results and compare the values of capital associated with predefined 
insolvency levels with the regulatory capital required under the IRB foundation approach. 
Section 4 will show how the previous evidence can provide the basis of an integrated 
regulatory approach to loan loss reserves and capital. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology and Data 
The most commonly used methodologies to estimate the credit loss distributions 
of a loan portfolio (be it the aggregate portfolio of the banking system or of a bank or of a 
particular business-line of a bank) are model-based approaches. In general, individual   5
instrument default probabilities are estimated using an econometric model and then these 
and other parameters are introduced into the model to obtain the loss distribution curve 
for the portfolio.
9 Simplifying assumptions are employed both at the stage of the 
estimation of the parameters (estimation risk) and in developing the model (model risk).  
Often it is even difficult to measure what distortions both types of risks may induce on 
the on the predictions that these models generate. 
For example, commonly used models – such as the KMV option based model, the 
McKinsey macro simulation model, the (JPMorgan offshoot) Riskmetrics’ Creditmetrics 
model, the Credit Swiss First Boston’s Creditrisk+ model – rely on assumptions 
concerning the number of risk factors, and the estimation of the factor loadings, factors’ 
volatilities, and factors’ correlations. Such estimations are subject to greater error in the 
context of emerging economies, where often information is of a poorer quality and 
regime changes may be more frequent.  Moreover, the estimation of each model relies on 
a set of quite specific data requirements and assumptions that make cross-country and 
even cross institution comparisons problematic.
10 
For these reasons, in this paper we take a different approach intended to minimize 
the impact of such errors on the estimation of the credit losses distribution function and to 
maximize the degree of comparability across countries. Following Carey (2002) we adopt 
a bootstrapping technique that essentially enables us to mimic the shape of the loss 
distribution function of any specific loan portfolio. Notwithstanding the lack of an 
                                                 
9 See Balzarotti, Falkenheim and Powell (2003)  for one example. 
10 The companion papers on Argentina and Mexico follow similar methodologies to a large extent but are 
not exactly comparable as data sources are different and specific assumptions inevitably may also differ.   6
underlying model, bootstrapping techniques can be used to simulate the impact that 
specific shocks or cyclical impulses have on the frequency distribution of credit losses. 
The re-sampling approach is very flexible and lends itself to many alternative simulation 
exercises aimed, for example, at measuring the exposure to credit losses of portfolios 
composed of loans of different size, maturity and rating granted to a specific industry or 
geographic region. An example of how the aggregate results for the banking system can 
be broken down and separately analyzed for banks of different size is presented, with 
reference to the Mexican case, in the Appendix. 
In line with the methodological aim of this paper, we have conducted a reasonably 
basic bootstrapping exercises aimed at simply replicating the distribution of credit losses 
prevailing at a specific period of time
11 and in three countries; namely Argentina, Mexico 
and Brazil.  We view this as a first step and suggest later what follow-up work might be 
of interest on a wider country sample.
12 
In each of the three countries the Central Bank maintains a Public Credit Registry 
(PCR) that contains information on a very large number of loans in the financial system.  
The objectives and design of these databases is the subject of Miller (2003) and in a 
companion paper we explore further the design issues, given the potential of these 
databases as tools to analyze credit risk (Majnoni, Miller, Mylenko, and Powell, 2004). 
The first step of the procedure consists of extracting, from the PCR, a large pool of 
performing loans to the (non-financial) corporate sector at a particular date. This pool 
                                                 
11 Typically we consider the default experience over a 12-month period. 
12 Simple modifications of the sampling procedures (Carey, 2002) or of the selection of loans extracted 
from the Credit Registers would enable to select predefined risk profiles and visualize very effectively the 
different risk embedded in specific forms of risk exposure.   7
then reflects the overall risks of lending to the corporate sector in each particular country. 
Second, we define default as the event of more than 90 days past due payments.
13 Third, 
we classify loans into two different categories according to whether they have maintained 
their initial status or have defaulted over the following twelve months. Fourth, we 
randomly sample from this pool of loans a pre-defined number of loans (in our case 500), 
intended to mimic the loan portfolio of a medium-sized bank. Given a predefined 
recovery ratio (assumed here to be equal to 50% of the face value of a defaulted loan) we 
compute the value of the losses of the sampled portfolio, expressing this as a fraction of 
the face value. Fifth, we replicate the last step a large number of times (20,000 in our 
case) to generate a frequency distribution of credit losses that mimics the one faced by 
banks. 
This technique allows us to replicate the real risks faced by banks without specific 
knowledge or assumptions regarding the factorial structure of risk or the correlation 
among different risk factors. The lack of an underlying model precludes simulation 
exercises, based say on the shocks to specific factors, but does not prevent us from 
quantifying the amount of capital and provisions that are necessary to shelter a bank from 
the risk of default at any level of probability. This is of course of prime interest to the 
banking regulator for considering the appropriate design of solvency rules, as discussed 
more in detail in Section 4.   
Charts 1 to 3 illustrate, for the three countries, the frequency distribution of three 
variables involved in the experiment. Panel a reports the frequency distribution of the size 
                                                 
13 This follows the typical definition of a non-performing loan according to international best practices and 
to one of the criteria suggested by the Basel Committee.   8
of individual loans, extracted from the PCRs, and that represent the universe from which 
our samples of 20,000 loans are drawn; panel b shows the frequency distribution of the 
dollar value of the 20,000 randomly selected portfolios; and finally, panel c shows the 
distribution of credit losses of the 20,000 randomly selected portfolios as a fraction of the 
face value of the respective portfolios. 
A visual inspection of the charts shows clear differences among the three samples. 
The concentration of loan-dimension toward the smallest size category is more evident in 
Argentina (50 percent of all the loans extracted from the credit register are smaller than 
US$100,000) and in Mexico (80 percent of all the loans extracted from the credit register 
are smaller than US$100,000).Due to the different sample construction method adopted 
in Brazil, loans smaller than US$100,000 appear to be less numerous (37%), as they only 
represent the portion of small loans that are part of global exposures larger than 
US$300,000. The different definition of the universe is reflected in the distribution of the 
sampled portfolios and of their exposure to credit losses. The charts for Mexico and 
Argentina show considerably more skewed distributions for both portfolios’ value and 
credit losses than the comparable distribution computed for Brazil. As a supplement to 
the visual information provided by the charts, we have summarized in Table 1 a set of 
descriptive statistics of the distribution of the 20,000 randomly sampled portfolios. 
3. Empirical Results 
The main results of the samples just described are reported in Table 2, where we 
have indicated for each country the value of expected losses (EL) and the value of 
unexpected losses (UL) associated to each percentile level of the (right tail of the)   9
simulated distribution of credit losses. Here we refer to the total amount of losses equal to 
the sum of the expected and unexpected component as the value at risk. The value at risk 
and its components, the expected and unexpected loss, are critical in defining the volume 
of bank capital and loan loss reserves necessary to achieve a predefined level of 
protection for the banking system. 
However, before commenting in detail on the simulation results we would like to 
state an important caveat upfront.  Data limitations have not allowed sampling over 
several years and therefore the simulation results reported in Table 2 should be 
interpreted as reflecting a photograph or snap-shot of a particular country in a particular 
year. The results cannot and should not be interpreted as average values representing 
credit risk exposure over different time horizons, nor over the full economic cycle. While 
a robust parameterization for capital and loan loss reserves requires data spanning at least 
a whole cycle the evidence that we present here support the need of a careful calibration 
effort and for a new regulatory approach to capital and loan loss reserves in emerging 
economies. 
In the case of Argentina, the results reflect the events of 2001.  In that year there 
was a recession that led to a fall of GDP equal to 4.4% in real terms and a crisis that was 
growing exponentially in terms of its depth.  In December 2001, bank deposits were 
frozen and there was considerable economic and political uncertainty. Over the same 
period, Mexico experienced a stagnation of economic activity with GDP growth equal to 
zero and a reduction of bank credit to GDP to 11.9%, the lowest value of the last decade. 
Not dissimilar was the situation in Brazil where a slowdown of economic activity brought 
GDP growth down to only 1.3% and led to a contraction of bank credit in real terms.  To   10
summarize, while the results will naturally reflect a period in time, the snap-shot reflects 
economic stress in all three countries and recession, albeit not the worst of the crisis, in 
one country (Argentina). 
With this qualification, Table 3 presents our results and compares them with those 
associated to the Basle II requirements and with S&P historical evidence of default rates. 
Simulation results provide a measure of the size of expected losses and unexpected losses 
and of the values that capital and loan loss reserves need to achieve to protect banks from 
insolvency in 95%, 99% or 99.9% of negative occurrences – or 95%, 99% and 99.9% of 
the distribution. For the three countries considered, expected losses proved to be in an 
interval between 1% and 5% (column 2). Assuming provisions to cover this amount, the 
amount of capital necessary to provide protection for UL up to 99% of the distribution 
(99% of negative occurrences) appears to be in the range of 15% for both Argentina and 
Mexico. The capital that would be required to cover 99.9% of the distribution is 
significantly higher at 21% for Argentina and 31 % for Mexico. 
We can compare these results with the level of capital that would be generated 
using the estimated probability of default and the formula proposed by the Basel 
Committee for the Foundation IRB approach.
14 The Basel formula applied to the 
simulated PDs generates capital requirements equal to 9.7% for Mexico, 14.1 for Brazil 
and 14.9% for Argentina (column 6), which appear considerably lower than those 
generated by our simulations at the 99.9% level of confidence. 
                                                 
14 We have used the formula for assessing the capital requirement for the corporate portfolio as described in 
Basel Committee’s Consultative Paper 3 (Basel Committee, 2003) and revised in the Basel Committee’s 
note of January 2004 (Basel Committee, 2004).   11
We can also compare our results with the capital requirements that would be 
generated by the Basel formula, using the corporate bond historical one year PD default 
rate computed by S&P for different rating categories (column 8) and applying it to the 
similar rating obtained by each country for its sovereign risk in domestic currency 
exposures to obtain expected and unexpected losses (columns 9 and 10). 
Finally we compare our results to those of a similar exercise conducted by Carey 
(2002) with a loan portfolio intended to mimic the risk exposure of a representative US 
banks.  It is interesting to observe that the level of EL in a period of extreme stress such 
as that represented by the 1929 crisis would have been lower of the EL in a crisis 
scenario, as the Argentine one. 
As an example of the many possible ad hoc applications of our resampling 
procedure, we report in the Appendix, a breakdown by banks of different size of the 
aggregate results reported in Table 3 and in Chart 2 for Mexico, that illustrates how risk 
exposures may vary across different groups of intermediaries.  
Three preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the results. The first is that the 
Basel formula, applied to our sample of non-G10 countries, generates levels of protection 
inferior to the claimed 99.9%. As the IRB is currently calibrated, the degree of protection 
would be in the range of 95-99% of the credit loss distribution. Another way to state this 
result is that to achieve the 99.9% level protection advocated by the Basel Committee, 
countries would require substantially increased capital requirements over and above the 
8% minimum requirement advocated in Basel II.
15  Moreover the fact that we have found 
                                                 
15 Basel II’s IRB formula in fact calculates assets at risk and then capital requirements are defined as 8% of 
assets at risk.  So equally our results may be interpreted as saying that assets at risk must be larger   12
a different overall level of required capital to achieve the level of protection theoretically 
granted by the Basel IRB curve, calls into question the curve calibration for individual 
instruments. In other words, given the types of default probabilities in emerging 
countries, it is not clear that the IRB curve, as written, would be appropriate to apply to 
individual instruments to ensure a good approximation to portfolio risk. 
The second conclusion is that emerging countries may face a difficult choice if 
they wish to apply the IRB approach.  They may either implement the IRB curve as it is 
written and hence implicitly opt for a lower degree of protection than that envisaged by 
the Basel Committee or they must attempt to recalibrate the curve and perhaps attempt to 
ensure a higher level of protection up to 99.9% as suggested by the BCBS.  Of course this 
should not come as a surprise, as presumably the same type of issue arose with Basel I 
and indeed many countries adopted the Basel I methodology but with a higher minimum 
than the 8% figure recommended by the Basel Committee. 
A third conclusion of our results is that, for emerging countries, the foundation 
IRB level of capital requirement is (notwithstanding its benevolent risk calibration), is 
likely to give higher capital requirements than the existing 8% minimum of the accord.  
In the case of Argentina, the IRB foundation approach gives a requirement of about 15% 
but in fact is close to actual capital requirements in Argentina at that time.
16 In the case of 
Mexico and Brazil the foundation IRB approach would, according to our simulations, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(maintaining the 8% capital requirement) or that the 8% should be increased to achieve 99.9% protection.  
This discussion also assumes that provisions cover expected losses. 
16 Argentina had a baseline 11.5% capital requirement but various add-ons implied that the overall 
requirement was close to 15% of Basel calculated assets at risk.   13
yield requirements of around 10% and 14% - higher than Basel’s 8% and higher than 
current levels in Mexico (8%) and in Brazil (11%). 
However, this discussion uses the IRB foundation approach with the actual 
default experience to measure the default probabilities. Using the S&P corporate 
calibrated mappings from ratings to default probabilities and the rating of the relevant 
sovereign we obtain much lower figures. Such a rating is interpreted by rating agencies as 
the floor to non-government ratings and therefore the associated PD, EL and UL can be 
considered as a floor for corporate sector’s PD, EL, and UL. Table 3 shows that, 
notwithstanding the lower level of capital requirements derived from S&P ratings and 
probabilities of default, increased capital charges are likely to emerge for all Latin 
America and Caribbean countries starting from countries enjoying an investment grade 
rating such as Colombia, where the sum of EL and UL already exceeds the value of the 
all encompassing 8% capital requirement of the current Accord.  
To conclude this section, our results suggest that, while the IRB foundation 
implies a rather generalized increase in capital requirements, it may not afford the 99.9% 
protection advocated by the BCBS given the default probabilities encountered in 
emerging countries.  This result also calls into question the calibration of the published 
curve for use in these environments.  Assuming provisions cover expected losses, our 
results indicate that to achieve 99% protection would require capital levels significantly 
higher than the Basel I’s 8% and around a 15% overall requirement. To achieve 99.9% 
protection would require higher levels of capital. While these levels were close to 
Argentina’s overall capital requirement in 2001, it would represent a steep increase in 
capital requirements for many countries. We now turn to consider how potentially   14
different calibration results for emerging economies could fit into a Basel-compatible 
implementation strategy of risk based capital and loan loss reserves requirements. 
4. Policy Implications 
As stated, our estimations of required levels of capital are based on the 
assumption that provisions cover expected loss.  In fact in some countries of the region, 
provisions may cover more than expected loss. In our simulations we defined default as 
more than 90 days past due and a loss given default of 50%.  And yet many countries ask 
for provisions of significantly higher than the level of expected losses for loans with past 
due payments inferior to 90 days,  reaching 100%  for loans above 90 days past due.  This 
discussion underlines the need for a highly coordinated system for loan loss reserves and 
capital requirements. Indeed it is the sum of provisions and capital that should be 
compared against the value at risk (the sum of expected and unexpected loss) and not 
necessarily provisions against expected loss and capital against the unexpected 
component.  Hence, if for some reason (legal or otherwise) there are impediments to 
increase capital to cover unexpected losses relative to the desired level of protection, then 
provisions might be increase over and above the level of expected loss. 
The underlying need is then for a system to attempt to gauge the overall, value at 
risk of loans rather than their expected or unexpected loss components. This then calls 
into question the common system of (1) a general loan loss reserve (2) a specific loan loss 
classification and provision depending on past performance (say according to the 
traditional 5 category classification) and (3) a specified level of capital.     15
The Basel II IRB framework suggests a minimum number of 9 loan classifications 
or buckets, leaving banks free to define the default probabilities assigned to each bucket.  
The IRB curve then defines the level of capital required given the default probability and 
other parameters. The IRB approach in fact simply validates some of what large, 
sophisticated G10 banks were already doing for their internal risk management purposes.  
The large banks have developed their own rating methodologies and have tested how 
their own ratings map into default probabilities and value at risk, both on an individual 
claim and on a portfolio basis. In fact many such banks are concerned that the approach 
does not give them sufficient freedom to use their own portfolio models of credit risk and 
must use the IRB formula to approximate the risk of a loan portfolio.
17  Supervisors 
across G10 have been catching up in their understanding of the internal risk management 
models and have maintained this formula approach to ease with monitoring and because 
as yet they are concerned precisely with the parameter estimation risk and model risk 
discussed above. 
    With respect to developing countries the starting point may be very different.  First, 
banks are in general less advanced in terms of developing internal rating methodologies, 
mapping those ratings into default probabilities and developing portfolio models.  Indeed 
in some countries the motivation on the part of supervisors to move toward Basel II’s 
IRB may be to get their banks to improve their own internal risk management, rather than 
catching up with what their banks are already doing. Second, supervisors have 
significantly less resources and in many countries supervisory skills and legal powers are 
sadly lacking.  Indeed the statistics on compliance with the Basel Core Principals for 
                                                 
17 See the comments by several large banks on the proposals on www.bis.org   16
Effective Banking Supervision, conveys a quite worrying picture of poor and inadequate 
banking supervision across many developing countries.  The average developing country 
is compliant with just seven of the 30 Basel Core Principals.
18  This implies that it may be 
many years before supervisors in these countries would be advised to adopt the IRB 
approach that gives a high degree of autonomy for banks to determine their rating 
methodologies and how those ratings will feed into default probabilities. 
We therefore suggest here a particular way to transit toward the IRB approaches 
using an integrated system for provisions and capital that may be easier for emerging 
country supervisors to monitor.  We label this approach the centralized rating based 
approach.
19 
The idea is very similar to the IRB framework in that banks must rate their clients 
and each rating bucket translates into a default probability that is then mapped into a 
specific value at risk.  However, the significant simplification with respect to the IRB 
approach is that the rating methodology and how the bank rating maps into a default 
probability is determined by the regulator.  Thus the regulator stipulates the nine or more 
buckets and the default probability (mean, minimum and maximum) that corresponds to 
each bucket.  Naturally this scale may for example conform to a scale used by a leading 
rating agency such as Standard and Poor’s but bank supervisors may as well define a 
preferred scale that most suitably describes the risk exposure experience of their own 
                                                 
18 In fact there are 25 BCPs, here we could the sub-Principles of principle 1 as Principles in their own right 
to obtain 30. 
19 See also Powell (2001) and Powell (2004).   17
country.
20 Banks must then simply slot their clients into the buckets suggested by the 
regulator but based on their estimation of each borrower’s probability of default. 
How would capital requirements be defined?  To some extent this would depend 
on the particular constraints, legal or otherwise on the regulator.  One approach, for 
regulators with few constraints, would be to rely on observed PDs and use the Basel II 
curve to calculate unexpected losses and set provisions and capital to cover expected and 
unexpected losses respectively. A second approach could be considered, however, if 
provisions could not be altered for whatever reason. In this case capital could be set to 
equal Value at Risk minus the allowable provisions along the lines suggested by the Base 
Committee in the revisions of the Consultative Paper 3 aimed at insuring a better 
integration of bank capital requirements and loan loss reserves (Basel Committee, 2004). 
A third approach, for regulators that have freedom to alter provisions but prefer a simple 
rule for capital, would be to adopt the Basel II standardized approach but then have 
forward looking provisions determined by the value at risk minus the Basel II SA 
approach capital requirement. This last approach would then use the CRB approach to 
enhance forward-looking provisions rules and in a fashion totally consistent with  
Basel II.  Moreover, over time banks internal rating methodologies would be developed 
and allow such banks, once ready, to move over to the full IRB approach. 
This approach suffers from one disadvantage.  Namely each bank would be forced 
to use the same rating scale (but not necessarily the same rating for each client as banks’ 
opinions might differ).  This means that a bank specializing in one type of business or 
                                                 
20 See, for a supervisory based application based on cluster analysis the paper by Foglia et al. (2001).     18
region would have to use the same rating scale as a bank in another line of business or 
region.  Put another way, as the buckets would be essentially defined by the minimum 
and maximum default probabilities, the default probability range of each bucket may not 
be the ideal one for each bank.  Some banks may have a large number of clients in one or 
two buckets of the centralized whereas if they used an internal scale then they could open 
those buckets into finer ones with a smaller range of default probabilities.  However, the 
supervisor would devise the buckets to be appropriate for the larger, more important 
institutions in the banking sector.
21  Then, by definition, the problems indicated, which 
would essentially be problems of how the requirements approximated to the relevant 
risks, would only be for smaller and non-systemic institutions.  
On the other hand, we suggest that there are many advantages of the CRB approach 
as a transition tool to the IRB approaches: 
•  Lower monitoring costs for bank supervisors.  Supervisors would have to verify the 
quality of banks’ methodologies to slot clients into the relevant buckets.  
Supervisors could very easily compare on this homogenous scale different banks’ 
ratings of particular corporates, corporates of similar characteristics, corporates in 
particular economic sectors or regions etc.  Moreover the homogenous scale would 
                                                 
21 In a more complex proposal the regulator could allow the use of more than one centralized scale 
reflecting different banking specializations. Interestingly the Hong Kong Monetary Authorities (HKMA) 
planned the introduction of a loan classification regulation similar to that described in this paper (HKMA, 
2002) with loan grades characterized by an upper and lower probability of default for each grade. The large 
number of Hong Kong banks that eventually opted for IRB approach did not make the implementation of 
the regulation necessary, but the scheme preserve its full validity for countries where the majority of banks 
will not opt for an IRB approach or where supervisory resources may be inadequate to face the challenges 
of the IRB approach.     19
allow the supervisor to easily aggregate ratings and default experience to back-test 
the mapping from the rating buckets to the default probabilities. 
•  The system would ensure a consistent treatment of capital and loan loss reserves.  
This is of course a vital component of Pillar 2 and Basel Core Principle 8. 
•  Favor the development of a risk based capacity within the banking system 
independently from each country decision to officially remain in Basel I or to adopt 
the different options of Basel II. 
•  The homogeneity of bank classification schemes would provide the system of an 
important additional property: individual banks data could be aggregated at a 
country level generating an important, so far mostly missing, information about the 
cyclical developments of credit quality. It would also make possible to monitor the 
effect of structural reforms (legal, regulatory, dissemination of credit information) 
on the quality of credit and on the cost of credit. Current Basel II arrangements 
under the IRB preclude such developments and have not considered the important 
public good element represented by this information externality). 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have discussed a simple methodology for the integrated 
estimation of expected and unexpected losses for countries that have a source of 
centralized credit information, such as a credit register, and we have shown how these 
estimates can provide the basis for a simplified risk based bank solvency regulation that 
is compatible with Basel II and could be used by countries that are not yet ready to adopt 
the IRB approach.    20
We have employed a homogeneous bootstrapping methodology to analyze credit 
risk in three emerging markets in Latin America.  We believe that this is the first attempt 
to provide estimations of credit risk in banks across different emerging countries using a 
homogeneous methodology.  While our results are limited as they correspond to a 
photograph at one time period, rather than measuring risk across the whole economic 
cycle, the time period chosen was one of stress in each of the three economies, albeit 
before the worst of the Argentine crisis. The bootstrapping methodology implies that our 
estimates are free from the usual problems of parameter estimation error and model error 
that plague standard attempts to measure portfolio credit risk. 
The results indicate that in order to achieve a 99% level of protection (in other 
words such that capital covers the unexpected loss to 99% of the distribution), capital 
requirements would need to be significantly higher than Basel I’s 8% and closer to 15% - 
close to Argentina’s overall requirement at that time.  In order to achieve 99.9% 
protection, as per the advertised goal in Basel II, would require significantly higher 
numbers. These results assume that provisions cover expected losses.  However, given 
that several countries require provisions to exceed expected losses, the amount of capital 
needed to cover a 99.9% level of value at risk may be significantly lower than that 
suggested by the level of unexpected losses. We also find that Basel II’s foundation IRB 
approach, while resulting in increases in capital requirements above Basel I, would result 
in levels closer to the 90-95% protection rather than the 99.9% level stated as used in its 
calibration.  This calls into question the calibration of the IRB curve for use in emerging 
countries. We believe that further research is required in this area to consider if and how   21
the Basel II IRB might be recalibrated for countries that wish to adopt this approach but 
that have default probabilities significantly higher than the G10’s. 
In the second part of the paper, we discussed issues regarding the implementation 
of Basel II’s IRB approach in emerging countries. In particular we suggested that many 
emerging countries may be many years away from IRB implementation. Clearly a first 
priority for many countries is to improve supervisory skills and enhance resources and 
work on legal issues to more fully comply with the Basel Core Principals for Effective 
Banking Supervision.  Given that this process will take time, we suggest a simpler 
Centralized Rating Based approach as a way to transit toward the IRB. 
The main difference with the IRB approach is that although banks would rate 
their clients, the regulator would set the rating methodology by defining the way in which 
the rating buckets would map to default probabilities. We suggest that initially this 
approach could be used to set forward-looking provisioning requirements.  A country 
could then adopt Basel II’s standardized approach, set provisions using the CRB 
methodology to cover the value at risk minus the Basel II’s SA capital and in that way 
ensure that banks’ total reserves (provisions plus capital) covered the entire value at risk 
up to the desired level of protection.   22
References 
 
Altman, E. I and A. Saunders., (1998). “Credit risk measurement: Developments over the 
last 20 years”, Journal of Banking and Finance. 
Balzarotti, V., M. Falkenheim and A. Powell (2001) "On the use of portfolio risk models 
and capital requirements in emerging markets : the case of Argentina", World Bank 
Economic Review 2002 16: 197-212.  
Balzarotti, V., C. Castro and A. Powell  “Reforming Capital Requirements in Emerging 
Countries: Calibrating Basel II using Historical Argentine Credit Bureau Data and 
CreditRisk+” mimeo. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella prepared for World Bank- 
ASBA-Bacen conference, Rio de Janeiro February 13
th 2004. 
Cavallo, M. and G. Majnoni, "Do Bank Provision for Bad Loans in Good Times? 
Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications", in "Ratings, Rating Agencies and the 
Global Financial System" eds. Richard Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, and Carmen 
Reinhart, Kluwer Academics Publishers, 2002. 
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, (2003) “Consultative Document: Overview of 
New Capital Accord”, April. 
 --     , (2004)“Modification to the Capital Treatment for Expected and Unexpected 
Credit Losses in the New Basel Accord”,  January. 
Carey, M (1998), “Credit risk in private debt portfolios”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53: 
pp.1363-87, August 
--     , (2002). “A guide to choosing absolute bank capital requirements”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, n.1. 
Cronemberg, G., S. Mikio, V. Salomao, R. Schechtman, (2003), “Credit Information, 
Credit Risk Measurement, and the Regulation of Bank Capital and Provisions in 
Mexico”, Banco Central do Brazil, mimeo. 
Falkenheim M. and A. Powell, (2000). “The use of credit bureau information for the 
estimation of credit risk: the case of Argentina”, mimeo, Central Bank of Argentina. 
Ferri, G., Li-Gang L., and G. Majnoni (2001), "The Role of Rating Agencies 
Assessments in Less Developed Countries: Impact of the Proposed Basel Guidelines", 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25, No. l. 
Foglia, A., (2003), “Using Credit register and Company Account Data for Measuring 
Credit Risk: A Supervisory Approach”, Banca d’Italia, mimeo. 
Foglia, A., S. Iannotti, P Marullo Reedtz, (2001), “The Definition of the Grading Scales 
in Bank’s Internal Rating Systems”, Banca d’Italia, mimeo. 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, (2002), “Revision of Loan Classification System”, 
mimeo, September. 
Kupiec, P. (2001). “Is the new Basel Accord incentive compatible”, mimeo, IMF. 
Laeven, L. and G. Majnoni, "Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too 
Much, Too Late?", Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol 12, pp.178-197, 2003.   23
Majnoni, G., M. Miller, N. Mylenko, and A Powell, (2004) “Improving Credit 
Information, Bank Regulation, and Supervision: On the Role and Design of Public 
Credit Registries “, mimeo.  
Marquez, J., J. L. Negrin, P. O’Dogherty, A.Werner, (2003), “Credit Information, Credit 
Risk Measurement, and the Regulation of Bank Capital and Provisions in Mexico”, 
Banco de Mexico, mimeo.  
Miller, M., (2003). Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Pagano, M., ed., Defusing Default: Incentives and Institutions, Washington, Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Powell, A., (2002). “A capital accord for emerging economies?” World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper, n. 2808. 
 --  , (2004) “Basel II and Developing Countries: Sailing through the Sea of Standards” 
mimeo. World Bank and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.   24
































































































































































Figure 2.     Mexico: Relevant Frequency Distributions from the Resampling 
Exercise 
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Table 1: Simulated Loan Portfolios: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data refer to the 12 months period indicated for each country. The Number of 
Observations refer to the number of bank loans to non financial entities and above a certain 
minimum size that were extracted from the national credit registers of each country at the 
beginning of the 12 months period. The criteria underlying the selection of loans from the 
credit registers differ slightly across countries. For Mexico and Argentina, a loan refers to 
the overall position of a single borrower with the banking system as a whole. The positions 
selected are those larger or equal to US$21,000 for Argentina. For Mexico in addition to 
loans larger or equal than US$ 20,000, reported on a compulsory basis, are included loans 
of smaller size that are reported on a voluntary basis. For Brazil the minimum size is higher 
and equal to US$300,000 but positions with different banks that concur to define the total 
exposure are treated as distinct individual loans. The descriptive statistics (Mean, Median, 
Mode, Stand Dev. Min and Max) refer to the distribution of the value of the 20,000 
portfolio of 500 loans each, randomly sampled from the pool of loans described above. 
Exact sources and definitions of each variable can be found in the main text.  
 
Country N.  Obs. Mean    
($ mln) 
Median   
($ mln) 
Mode    
($ mln) 
St. Dev.   
($ mln) 
Min      
($ mln) 
Max     
($ mln) 
            
Mexico      (Dec.2000-Dec.2001)  188,165 85 62 33 89 16  1,477 
Argentina  (Dec.2000-Dec.2001)  70,017 242 215 182 104  72  943 
Brazil         (Oct.2001-Oct.2002)  41,784 551 538 510 110 275  1,306 
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Table 2: Capital and Provisions: Unexpected and Expected Losses Estimations Based on Simulation Results and on 
S&P Observed Average Default Frequency 
 
Expected Loss (EL) in the simulation results section is given by the mean value of the simulated distribution of credit losses. 
Simulations are based on the random extraction without replacement of 500 loans from the pool of loans registered in the Credit Register of each 
country, to simulate a standard bank loan portfolio. The extraction is repeated 20,000 times (this time with replacement) to obtain 20,000 
portfolios. The distribution of credit losses for each portfolio provides the 20,000 observations used to simulate the distribution of credit losses. 
Unexpected Losses (UL) at different levels of probability represent the value of credit losses (as a percentage of the face value of the portfolio) 
corresponding the percentile on the right tail of the distribution minus the EL given by the mean value of the distribution. Basel UL indicates the 
value of Unexpected Losses (UL) computed according to the algorithm proposed by the Basel Committee in its January 30, 2004 document. The 
value of PD used in the algorithm is given by half the value of the EL, assuming the same 50% Loss Given Default (LGD) used in the simulation 
exercise. In the section of the table related to S&P based statistics, RATING represents the lowest value of domestic currency sovereign rating 
expressed by S&P over the time period considered. This is only partially true in the case of Argentina, where we have conventionally selected a 
rating of CCC, although the formal rating was suspended in November 2001 on  the eve of the Government’s default on its sovereign debt. PD is 
computed on the basis of the historical average one year default frequency on S&P rated corporate bonds; LGD has been assumed equal to 50%. 
Basel UL refers to the value of Unexpected Losses (UL), computed according to the algorithm proposed by the Basel Committee in its January 
30, 2004 document and using the value of PD corresponding to the EL/LGD value. Per Memoriam are reported the results of the simulation of 
credit losses presented in Carey (2002) and based on the use of  a loan portfolio that mimics the risk exposure of a medium size bank in the USA 
and applying the PD values observed at times of systemic distress such as during the 1989-91 moderate recession in the USA and during the 
1929 recession.  
 
Country  Credit losses: simulation results  Credit losses: S&P sovereign rating 
  
PD  EL  UL = 95%UL = 99% UL = 
99.9% 
Basel UL 
(Jan 04)  Rating PD  EL  Basel UL 
(Jan 04)
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
               
Mexico      (Dec. 2000-Dec.2001)  2.70%  1.35%  4.44%  16.58%  31.64%  9.68%  BBB+  0.37%  0.19%  4.75% 
Argentina    (Dec.2000-Dec.2001)  9.60%  4.80%  7.30%  14.80%  21.80%  14.93%  CCC  27.87% 13.94% 19.57% 
Brazil         (Oct.2001-Oct.2002)  8.32%  4.16%  3.51%  6.07%  10.46%  14.15%  BB+  1.38%  0.69%  8.07% 
                             
per memoriam:              
Carey  (2002)  simulations:               
    - USA 1989-91  3.00%  1.50%  1.62%  2.55%  3.91%  10.07%  -  -  -  - 
    - USA 1929  6.24%  3.12%  2.54%  3.80%  5.36%  12.70%  -  -  -  -   29
Table 3: Capital and Provisions in Latin American Countries Based on S&P Ratings 
 
Country classification refers to Standard and Poors' domestic currency sovereign 
rating as of December 2003. The variable expected loss (EL) is the product of the probability 
of default (PD) and of the loss given default (LGD). PD is computed on the basis of the 
historical average one year default frequency on S&P rated corporate bonds; LGD has been 
assumed equal to 50%. Basel UL refers to the value of Unexpected Losses (UL) computed 
according to the algorithm proposed by the Basel Committee in its January 30, 2004 document 
and using the value of PD corresponding to the EL/LGD value.  
 
 
S&P   
classification  Countries EL  Basel UL      
(Jan 04)  EL+UL 
AAA  - 0.00%  0.34%  0.34% 
AA Chile  0.00% 0.61%  0.62% 
A  Barbados, México, Trinidad &Tobago  0.02% 1.56%  1.59% 
BBB Colombia  0.17% 4.75%  4.91% 
BB  Belize, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala Panama, Peru,  0.62% 8.07%  8.69% 
B  Bolivia, Jamaica, Suriname, Uruguay, 
Venezuela  2.71% 12.54% 15.25% 
CCC  Ecuador, Paraguay, Dominican Rep  12.54% 19.57%  32.11% 
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APPENDIX:   Mexico: Simulated Expected and Unexpected Credit Losses for Banks 
of Different Size 
 
Table A1: Simulated Loan Portfolios: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data refer to loans registered in the Mexican Credit Register. The Number of Observations refer 
to the number of bank loans to non financial entities at the end of in December 2000. A loan refers to the 
overall position of a single borrower with the banking system as a whole. In addition to loans larger or equal 
than US$ 20,000, reported on a compulsory basis, are included loans of smaller size that are reported on a 
voluntary basis. The descriptive statistics (Mean, Median, Mode, Stand Dev. Min and Max) refer to the 
distribution of the value of the 20,000 portfolio of 500 loans each, randomly sampled from the pool of loans 
described above. Exact sources and definitions of each variable can be found in the main text.  
 
Bank size  N. Obs.  Mean    
($ mln) 
Median   
($ mln) 
Mode    
($ mln) 
St. Dev.   
($ mln) 
Min      
($ mln) 
Max     
($ mln) 
            
Small  2,984 344 340 306  52  200 623 
Médium  47,532 115  91 87 84 27  929 
Large  137,649 67 45 67 85 14  1,163 
Total  Banking  System  188,165 85 62 33 89 16  1,477 
 
Table A2:  Capital and Provisions: Unexpected and Expected Losses  
Estimations Based on Simulation Results 
 
Expected Loss (EL) in the simulation results section is given by the mean value of the simulated 
distribution of credit losses. Simulations are based on the random extraction without replacement of 500 
loans from the pool of loans registered in the Credit Register of each country, to simulate a standard bank 
loan portfolio. The extraction is repeated 20,000 times (this time with replacement) to obtain 20,000 
portfolios. The distribution of credit losses for each portfolio provides the 20,000 observations used to 
simulate the distribution of credit losses. Unexpected Losses (UL) at different levels of probability represent 
the value of credit losses (as a percentage of the face value of the portfolio) corresponding the percentile on 
the right tail of the distribution minus the EL given by the mean value of the distribution. Basel UL indicates 
the value of Unexpected Losses (UL) computed according to the algorithm proposed by the Basel 
Committee in its January 30, 2004 document. The value of PD used in the algorithm is given by half the 
value of the EL, assuming the same 50% Loss Given Default (LGD) used in the simulation exercise.  
Bank size  Credit losses: simulation results 
  
PD  EL  UL = 95%  UL = 99%  UL = 99.9% 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
        
Medium 4.16%  2.08%  5.91%  12.69%  22.16% 
Large 1,96%  0.98%  3.01%  18.39%  35.79% 
Total Banking System  2.70%  1.35%  4.44%  16.58%  31.64% 
        